Under the Basel II accord, improving probability of default models is a key risk-management priority. There are four main aspects of this research: suggesting the bank default classification; using a wide time horizon (quarterly Russian banking statistics from 1998 to 2011); investigating the macroeconomic and institutional characteristics of the banking sector environment and finally, testing the accuracy of the models developed. We have employed nonlinearity and automatic classification of the independent variables in our models, paying attention to the structure of the banking market as well as to the reliability of the models developed. We have compared several models for estimating default probabilities. From the results of this comparison, we have chosen the binary logit -regression with quasi panel data structure. Our key findings are:
Introduction
This paper reviews binary choice models that attempt to describe, predict and prevent the defaults of financial institutions, namely banks, with regard to the Russian banking industry specifically. The probability of default (PD) is the likelihood of a bank failure over a fixed assessment horizon. To forecast a bank's default probability a logistic model was applied based on CAMELS methodology together with an adequate proxy selection.
Numerous papers dedicated to the probability of default model (PD model) creation studied circumstances associated with recessions in developed countries, not in transitional ones. However logistic modeling is inherently more reliable for stable periods of economic development. The aim of this research is to propose an adequate forward-looking model, which rests on the relationship between banks' default rates and macroeconomic or financial banking statistics.
The model can be applied by three main parties in Russia:
 First, the model is valuable for the government, particularly the Central Bank of Russia. The approach developed in this study can diversify the existing estimates of bank performance. For example, by employing the model the Central Bank of Russia can identify the most vulnerable banks and supervise them.
It can also provide some ideas to improve regulations, e.g. PD model development is an adequate strategy of risk-management, which can help the Regulator to smooth procyclicality of capital requirements.

Second, banks can use it to predict and prevent hardships. The model meets the requirements of Basel II and takes into account the dependence of credit risk on the business cycle. It can be exploited for internal financial monitoring in a commercial bank.
Third, the information about bank's default probability is essential for bank creditors and business partners.
To cover the topic of this paper we have taken the following steps:
The collection of financial, macroeconomic and institutional data about banks and their operational environment for the period from 1998 to 2011.  The selection of the relevant factors to assess a bank's default probability.  The econometric modelling.  A statistical comparison of models.
The exploration of the benefits of using panel data structure.  A discussion of the results of the study concerning the relationships between PDs and independent factors used in the models.
The Russian banking system: stability issues
In the late 1980s commercial banking revived in Russia. More than 2500 banks had been launched by 1995. Overall, about 3500 charters of incorporation have been issued by the Central Bank of Russia by the present moment. Rapid growth of quantitative and some qualitative measures is typical for this period. There was an upward trend in the Bank assets to GDP ratio with 36% recorded in 2000 and 67% by 2009. A similar pattern is evident in the Credit to GDP ratio which made up slightly less than 50% at the end of the period with diversification into lending to individuals. Also, most of the systematic problems in the Russian banking system were resolved. However drastic growth in the sector caused overheating with a resultant upturn in bad debts, when recession shook the world economy in 2008.
Stage 3. Sustainable growth: since 2010. Throughout this period a great emphasis has been put on the proportional development of the Russian banking system. It is vital to find a way out of Dutch disease, reinforce the capital base of the system and supervise Russian financial institutions prudently. The last issue is also urgent at the international level. Owing to the adoption of Basel II in Western Europe, national economic shocks are less sharp, although not avoided. It means that the implementation of up-todate risk-management technologies is a priority for Russian regulators, but this implementation has hit institutional, methodological and organizational barriers.
Russia still has 978 credit institutions, although the number has almost halved over the period from 1998 to 2012. Consequently, it is impossible to conduct field inspections regularly. That is why The Central Bank of the Russian Federation needs remote systems to monitor the national banking sector. The most vulnerable banks should be identified and supervised properly to make the Russian banking system more stable.
The probability of default model as an instrument of the distant supervising systems can also improve some regulations. For example, capital requirements ought to be risk-sensitive. It means that these should be stricter when risks are higher. In practice capital requirements are increased during recessions and decreased during upturns. In other words the capital requirements are procyclical. Obviously this contradicts the core idea of the Regulator. The application of an average PD in a banking system for risk measurement can help the Regulator to smooth procyclicality of capital requirements.
PD model development background: literature review
Approaches to developing Early Warning Systems (EWS) for the banking system as well as determinants of bank's financial distress in the developed world have been scrutinized in numerous papers and are summarized in Bluhm et al. (2010) . Mainly, this review will cover experience of developing countries and Russia, thus the national banking industry peculiarities will be taken into consideration. Generally speaking, balance sheet structure and other financial characteristics of banks, such as bank size and capitalization, are the most meaningful predictors of their defaults Peresetsky et al. (2011) . The first is usually measured as the logarithm of bank's total assets. There is a number of points in support of the crucial importance of this factor:  This variable is significant in the majority of models (see Karminsky et al. (2005) ; Peresetsky et al. (2011) ).

In emerging markets larger banks are better able to sustain and control the credit risk of long-term lending (see Chernykh & Theodossiou (2011) ).
Ceteris paribus, large banks a have higher insolvency risk than small ones (see Fungacova & Solanko (2009) ).  Large banks with intricate balance sheets are not always disciplined adequately, engaging in operations too complex for The Bank of Russia (see Claeys & Schoors (2007) ).
The second variable is capitalization, used to assess capital adequacy of banks, calculated as a proportion of a bank's capital to its total assets. This index defines a bank's coverage of risks with its own resources. That is why a low capital adequacy ratio is suspicious from the Regulator's point of view: banks with moderate capitalization shift future potential losses to clients and have a free hand in taking excessive risk. However, debt financing has its merits: overcapitalized banks run inefficiently, which may result in more non-working assets (see Tabak et al. (2011) ). Consequently U-shaped relationship between PD and bank capital adequacy ratio is expected.
According to the EWS for the Russian banking sector in Lanine & Vennet (2006) , greater capitalization of a bank diminishes its PD while bank size has no significant impact.
The next determinant of PD is a bank's liquidity position. Liquid assets are required to meet deposits outflows when they take place. Consistent with Lanine & Vennet (2006) , the positive effect of liquidity exhaustion on the odds of default is theoretically and empirically confirmed. To capture the liquidity risk a ratio of non-government securities to bank assets was employed. The task is to test whether a very liquid position worsens a bank's financial statement as a result of lower profitability or higher market risks incurred.
Z-score is another well-founded predictor. Statistically speaking, the Z-score shows the drop of returns measured in its standard deviation sufficient to erode bank's equity. In Fungacova & Solanko (2009) this index was interpreted as an integrated proxy for a bank's insolvency probability.
In line with the literature the inclusion of macroeconomic and institutional factors improves the model performance (see Karminsky et al. (2005) ). Quarterly GDP growth rates and Consumer Price Index are often used to take into account macroeconomic features of bank's operating environment, which are early predictors of a banking crisis. In Bock & Demyanets (2012) the authors examined the determinants of non-performing loans in developing countries with panel data analysis. Their results underscored the significance of GDP growth rate for empirical research in banking. In Mannasoo & Mayes (2009) this variable was regarded as a forwardlooking factor of upcoming bank insolvency. Parameters reflecting the stage of the economic cycle were discussed in Karminsky et al. (2005) . They came to the conclusion, that GDP growth rate, export to import ratio and conditions of trade are among the most reliable predictors of a bank failure in the long-run.
The other meaningful factors are institutional ones. Many researchers define bank ownership type as the dominant factor of its performance. The study Fungacova & Solanko (2009) concludes that foreign-owned banks show relatively high PDs as well as domestic and large state-controlled banks.
In contrast, Micco et al. (2007) showed that foreign banks achieve better operational results than others in developing countries. Clarke et al. (2005) reveals three principal points that negatively affect banks' scores for stability in the developing world. Firstly, an agency problem is inevitable in the case of governmental bank management. In addition, politicians often interfere with banks internal procedures to influence the economy in a desirable way, particularly before elections. Moreover, state banks lack a competitive market; this means that they are artificially protected from pure competition. Furthermore, Micco et al. (2007) explained that state banks hire excess employees, carry vast administrative expenses and are less profitable. Regardless of those facts, the Government always supports a state bank in cases of financial distress. Besides, these banks traditionally enjoy wider access to the interbank lending market. Unfortunately, it is impossible to quantify the effect of state ownership on PD on the grounds that there were no defaults of banks with considerable government participation in capital (more than 50% owned by the government, according to Vernikov (2011) ).
The factor of absolute foreign participation in bank capital (100% of capital) is in a similar trap: not one default occurred over the period from 1998 to 2011. A slight drop in the number of entirely foreign banks after 2008 was due to consolidation in the sector, not bank failures. Yet, in conditions of growing political, social and economic instability worldwide, foreign banks are not out of danger. Presumably, the solution is to broaden the definition of a foreign bank, regarding banks with more than 50% of equity owed by non-residents as foreign. Unfortunately, the relevant statistics are not available.
Russian banks changed their risk profile after the introduction of the deposit insurance system (DIS) in 2004 Fungacova & Solanko (2009 . As a result depositor motivation to monitor bank performance was discouraged, and banks adopted risky investment policies to gain profits and offer higher interest rates on savings to attract clients. This led to the problem of moral hazard in banking.
Another essential institutional factor is competition. Russia is an example of a territory with steep competitive heterogeneity (see Anzoategui et al. (2012) ). As a rule, Herfindahl Hirschman index (HHI) and Lerner index (LI) are applied to convey the level of competition that exists within a market and monopoly power of a definite bank correspondingly. Fungacova & Weill (2009) with panel data analysis contributes to the idea that banks with higher market power are more financially stable. In the competition profile the location of a banking business might also determine the default occurrences.
A detailed overview of PD model types is beyond the scope of the literature review. See Totmyanina (2011) regarding this issue.
3.
Data and model 3.1. Default definition The initial step to develop a PD model is to define what default is. There is no common opinion in the literature. A bank default probably implies the recall of a license and a prohibition to operate independently as a result of insolvency. The problem is that illegal financial operations as well as some other factors often cause license withdrawals 5 . Approximately half of these have no reference to the bank's ability to cover debts 6 .
In this paper the following events are indicators of default:  A bank's capital sufficiency level falls below 2%.

The value of bank's internal resources drops lower than the minimum established at the date of registration.  A bank fails to reconcile the size of the charter capital and the amount of internal resources.  Bank is unable to satisfy creditors' claims and make compulsory payments.  A bank is subject to sanitation by the Deposit Insurance Agency (Bank Restructuring Agency) or another bank.
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The next step is to create a list of the banks which defaulted over the period from1998 to 2011. The information was collected from the official website of the Central Bank of Russia and other public sources.
Sources of bank-specific financial information
Three sources of financial data relevant to the Russian banking system have been analyzed: the "Interfax" database, the BankScope database by Bureau van Dijk company and Mobile's "Banks and Finances" database. Preliminary analysis acknowledged the preeminence of the last database due to the wider time horizon and its satisfactory coverage of the Russian banking industry. We had Mobile's database available and authors are grateful to Prof. Petrov for access to the database.
Database description
We constructed a quarterly bank-specific financial database based on Mobile's information from 1998 to 2011. Earlier data seems to be spoiled by numerous tiny, fake (so-called "sleeping") banks and total chaos in the Russian banking system. In addition, monthly banking statistics might be less reliable than quarterly for accounting reasons. Raw data from "Banks and Finances" were collected in accordance with Russian accounting standards.
Over the 14-year period considered there were 910 license revocations, 467 of which were defaults in compliance with classification in Section 2.2, as well as 37 bank sanitations. The bar chart below demonstrates the distribution of registered defaults and their coverage. The set of raw variables from "Banks and Finances" with a description and summary statistics is given in the Appendix. The last seven variables in the table marked with an asterisk are based on the Profit and loss statements while the remainder of the variables are based on the Balance sheet data.
To facilitate the data analysis the sample was split into two parts. The first comprised observations before the beginning of 2010. It was used to develop models. The predictive power of the final PD models was tested on the second sample with observations for the years 2010 and 2011.
Binary choice model: logit analysis
This section includes a brief interpretation of a logistic model application to predict defaults. The binary dependent variable default equals one if an observation is classified as insolvency and zero otherwise. The model is able to estimate a bank's probability of default directly in the form:
is a function taking values between 0 and 1; x is a vector of n regressors (i. e. ). The basic principle of the maximum likelihood approach, used to estimate the logit-model, is to find the coefficient vector that maximizes the likelihood of observing the bank performance states ("insolvent" or "alive") in the sample as they are, dependent on the explanatory variables . Formally speaking, the following task is set:
[ ( ] for a sample with v and w observations of "insolvent" and "alive" classes respectively.
For greater details on this topic, see Greene (2007) .
Empirical model estimation 4.1. A Choice of financial regressors for the initial model
The database created could contain some measurement errors or inaccurate observations. To allow for this a clearing algorithm was implemented, which dropped suspicious observations for the class of "alive" banks 7 :

Lines in database with negative values for Total loans to the economy (KE), Total assets (CA) and Capital (SK).


The 1 st and 99 th percentiles of observations for each of relative variables, described in table 2 to avoid statistical outliers. Those ratios seem to be significant to determine bank's PD as provided by the literature review and common sense.
An automatic classification of the independent variables was applied to test the separating power of variables. To avoid statistical troubles variables with high correlation (over 0.3 in absolute value) were excluded from those with prominent separating power as well as factors with insufficient or unequally distributed observations. After that the multicollinearity problem was mitigated.
In the next stage we used the CAMELS framework to carry out a factor selection process. The idea of selecting capital, assets, management, earnings, liquidity and sensitivity variables to describe a bank's financial position was borrowed.  Capital-related set of variables Financial troubles immediately result in a sharp decline in a bank's capital. Furthermore, fluctuations in regulatory capital ratios for banks are monitored to check if they break minimum requirement. That is why the Capital to Total assets ratio was exploited as a factor in the PD model.  Assets-related set of variables Asset quality is a dominant factor of future profits and losses considered with a ratio of Nonperforming loans to Total loans to the economy. The logarithm of Total assets is a good measure of bank size.  Management-related set of variables Management is an important analytical consideration. Information about the organizational complexity of Russian banks is not available in open sources, so proxies were used instead. The proportion of Turnover on correspondent accounts to Total assets reflects the level of economic activity in a bank. Lower values might recognize a bank's inability to process payments and incentives of managers to curtail business. A logarithmic scale was used to avoid multicollinearity.  Earnings-related set of variables Profitability creates the economic value of a bank. No commercial company with permanent loses can be successful in the long-run. A typical profitability measure for all businesses, a Balance profit to Total assets ratio, was used.  Sensitivity & Liquidity related set of variables
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In traditional CAMELS methodology sensitivity reflects vulnerability of a business to market risks. We exploited Non-government securities to Total assets ratio to assess both liquidity management and carried market risks in a bank.
It is noteworthy that the database used is highly unbalanced, which is harmful for logistic analysis. The class imbalance problem arises when one group of observations (in this case, "insolvency" observations) are underrepresented compared to another (in this case, to "alive" observations). There are many ways to tackle the problem, which are discussed in He (2007) .
In this paper a modified methodology by Hosmer & Lemeshow (2000) was applied. Firstly, one thousand subsamples were done with all "insolvency" observations and enough of the other class to balance each of the one thousand subsets. Then a logistic model was estimated on a random subsample. Finally, derived coefficients were averaged and checked to be stable for the previously created subsamples.
Modeling
Our main goal is to predict a bank's default. For this reason independent lag variables are worth using. In this research statistical criteria have been employed to assess the goodness-of-fit of the current models: the significance level of coefficients, Pseudo R-squared, the area under the ROC curve and the ROC curve graphical comparison, specificity, sensitivity and the proportion of correctly classified outcomes 8 .
We found that model quality falls with lag climbing. Nevertheless, one-quarter lag is inadmissible for our goals: the obtained PD is the likelihood of a bank failure in a three-month period. The actual insolvency is likely to happen even earlier, so a user of the model is limited in time. To deal with this issue two-quarter lags were applied. The basic model specification is:
At the next stage nonlinearities were considered. An expanded model included all factors from the model (2) in powers up to three. Then, insignificant coefficients were dropped. As a result, a basic model with nonlinearities appeared:
After that a model improvement process was launched. In general the process is described by the flow chart below. After each of the iterations the most insignificant variables were excluded from a model. Also, LR-test confirmed the adequacy of inclusion for every set of factors. Macroeconomic parameters: use of quarterly GDP growth rates dgp_gr and the consumer price index cpi in order to account for the effect of macroeconomic environment on bank performance.
Basic with nonlinearities, time factor and macro parameters 3
Institutional parameters: -use of Lerner index l_index to consider the impact of monopoly power of the firm on its default probability.
-use of a dummy variable region indicating Moscow location of bank's headquarters.
-use of a dummy variable on a bank participation in a Deposit insurance system.
Basic with nonlinearities, time factor, macro parameters and institutional variables.
Diagram 8. A model improvement process: time dummies, macroeconomic variables, institutional factors. Table 4 provides information about the statistical properties of the key working models. These models should not be treated as final by the potential user, but might be employed if some data to develop more advanced models is unavailable.
Testing the model stability and comparison with alternatives
The final specification (4), the last working model, is stable enough to avoid the problem of overfitting according to estimation results in table 5 and diagram 9.
In addition, we tested robustness of the model (4) to gaps in the data. Under our results, gaps in the data impact the banks' default probabilities insignificantly.
Coefficients for the last working model were averaged on 1000 subsamples. The final model is (5).
) As mentioned, the out-of-sample prediction power was estimated in a subsample with observation for the years 2010 and 2011. To evaluate the quality of prediction two touch-stones were applied: the quarterly average number of banks in a risk group (predicted to face insolvency within half a year) and the number of correctly predicted defaults. Overall, 19 banks collapsed in 2010 and 2011. Table 6 shows the predictive results of the final regression (5) dependent on a separating condition. The out-of-sample prediction performance of the final model is prominent. According to our results, the level of 30% is an optimal separating condition: the size of a risk group is reasonable and 12 of 19 bank failures were correctly predicted. In practice, the choice of a separating criterion is based on user's capacity to inspect banks in the risk group accurately.
In this study we have explored the benefits of panel data analysis. In our case, the researcher is primarily interested in the particular units (Russian banks) in the sample, which is close to the population. That is why a fixed effect logit model with the final specification (4) was applied. Surprisingly, no predominance of panel logit model was observed. Moreover, a Hausman test for fixed effect logit versus simple logit confirmed our findings.
An attempt to improve the final specification with the Z-score measure also failed. Two of the three main components of this index, a bank's return on assets and capitalization, are presented in the specification as the Balance profit to Total assets and Capital to Total assets ratios respectively. Presumably, that is the reason for insignificance of the Z-score.
Estimation results
As described, the final model is:
It is important to note that the regression coefficient sign is useful to judge the influence of the relevant variable on a probability of default:
5.1. Financial bank-specific ratios Capitalization: Capital to Total assets ratio According to the estimation results over and undercapitalized banks exhibit higher default probabilities (diagram 10). The conclusion is consistent with the expressed expectations.
Diagram 10. Impact of ratio on default probability: ( ) ( ) Diagram 11. Impact ratio on default probability:
Diagram 12. Impact of ratio on default probability: ( ) ( ) Profitability: Balance profit to Total assets ratio Banks with extremely high and low profitability score higher default rates risks (diagram 11). Naturally, poor banks lack funds to pay the bills. Perhaps, banks with really high earnings take excessive risk, which leads to growing default probability. Moreover, in efficient markets it is impossible to maintain an outstanding profitability without bearing appropriate financial risk.
Bank size: Logarithm of Total assets Small as well as large banks have higher risk of insolvency (diagram 12). So the "Too big to fail" thesis does not hold in our paper. It is important for researchers to bear in mind that without nonlinearity in the final model the factor is not significant at all.
Credit quality: Non-performing loans to Total loans to the economy ratio Bank with considerable amount of bad debts are less stable, as supposed.
Operational activity: Logarithm of Turnover on correspondent accounts to Total assets ratio
Our main regression results demonstrate a negative correlation between а PD and а bank's operational activity. Hypothetically, lower Turnover on correspondent accounts in comparison with Total assets indicates a bank's inability to process payments and incentives for managers to curtail business.
Liquidity and market risks: Non-government securities to Total assets ratio Banks with a higher proportion of corporate securities in assets carry higher risk of a price slump in the market. Indeed, substantial investments in non-government securities might have no relation to liquidity management: it is probably the result of an aggressive investment policy, which causes higher PDs
Time factor Quarterly dummies
The only significant quarterly dummy variable indicates that on the average the probability of default is lower in the first quarter of a year. Our guess is that it is closely associated with the Regulator's bias to finish current investigations by the end of a year and start a new cycle from January.
Annual dummies
The developed model underestimates default probabilities for the year 2009. On the one hand the result reveals some unrecorded channels that significantly increased risks in the period of the recent financial crisis in 2009, for instance, the dependence of the Russian banking sector on funding from abroad. On the other hand, the model is adequate for the banking crisis in Russia in 2004 and even for the recession in 1998-1999. In other words, the model is able to predict crises.
Macroeconomic parameters
Quarterly GDP growth rates Unexpectedly, this variable is not significant. It is likely that we should have applied not quarterly, but annual GDP growth rates. Also the second macroeconomic variable could harm the estimation results Karminsky et al. (2005) . Alternatively, the financial ratios could have absorbed the impact on default probability of a business cycle.
Consumer price index A growing consumer price index, which accelerates inflation, increases bank's default probability. Inflation reduces the real returns on loans. At the same time depositors are able to withdraw money and put it into the bank again at a higher interest rate or spend it. Consequently banks suffer.
Institutional variables Lerner index
In line with the literature review, banks with higher monopoly power are more financially stable compared to others due to lower market pressure.
Location dummy
The Moscow-based banks have higher PDs on the average, which contradicts the findings in Fungacova & Solanko (2009) . According to Claeys & Schoors (2007) , the Russian banking regulator is reluctant to withdraw licenses out of Moscow region so as not to weaken competition in local markets.
We found evidence that bank participation in the Deposit insurance system does not influence its PD. The explanation is that the set of Deposit insurance system participants is too diversified.
Conclusion
In this paper an adequate probability of default model was developed. Over 60% of bank failures were correctly classified in out-of-sample prediction power tests.
Our main regression results revealed a quadratic relationship between a bank's capitalization, size, quarterly earnings and its probability of default. We confirmed the validity of the CAMELS framework together with macroeconomic, institutional and time factors to forecast bank's PD.
In addition, a variety of statistical criteria was employed to test the quality of the logistic model. A comparison with alternative models was carried out. However, neither panel data structure nor Z-score improved the final model performance.
There were a number of issues concerning the database: a lack of balanced; missing data, outliers and measurement errors in the raw bank-specific statistics; an overfitting problem and others. However, we have proposed solutions for these issues except for logistic model limitations to estimate the impact of a bank's ownership type on its default probability. A visible way out is the use of bank ratings to estimate PDs. This is a prospective direction for our research in the near future.
